This paper provides an explanation for why many organizations are concerned with “e-mail overload” and implement policies to restrict the use of e-mail in the office. In a theoretical model we formalize the tradeoff between increased productivity from high priority communication and reduced...

Empirical research has revealed some regularities regarding the innovation that takes place over the industry life-cycle. First, innovation is high when an industry is young and low when the industry matures, and second, product innovation decreases with industry maturity, while process...

Empirical research suggests that – despite strengthening conventional incentives to put in effort – exerting control might reduce worker performance. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can explain such hidden costs of control if individuals differ in their propensity...

This paper examines why heterogeneous tasks are offshored in different organizational forms, that is, offshored to multinational subsidiaries (“foreign insourcing”) or to subcontractors (“foreign outsourcing”). We develop a model in which multinational subsidiaries benefit from lower...

This paper investigates the determinants of trust in banking networks and, thus, identifies several forces determining the stabilizing effect of networks. Using a unique dataset of 249 German savings banks, the empirical results show that intense interaction with central coordinators supports...

The paper addresses two broad research questions: 1. How do internal uncertainty associated with the task environment and external uncertainty arising from market volatility impact organization design? 2. What are the relationships among various elements of organization design: delegation of...

We model an economy where it is beneficial for high-type organizations to collaborate with other high types, and where this assortative-matching pattern allows informed financiers to provide inexpensive funds to partner companies of their high-type ventures. The expected funding benefit...

We develop a principal–agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent's level of effort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and...

Conventional wisdom suggests that a global increase in monetary rewards should induce agents to exert higher effort. In this paper we demonstrate that this may not hold in team settings. In the context of sequential team production with positive externalities between agents, incentive reversal...

This study explores a nested representation of ethical, moral, social identity, motivated, opportunistic and reciprocal agent preferences to characterize screening contracts in a principal–agent model under adverse selection. This leads to a ranking of the type of social preferences that...