This paper investigates the hypothesis that the objective function of economic agents is non-separable in economic incentives and social preferences. We study fixed-prize contests in a 2×2 experimental design, varying orthogonally the degree of competition of the incentive mechanism (all-pay...

We introduce new treatments of a voluntary contribution mechanism with opportunities to punish in order to see how contributions, punishments and earnings change when punishment is in the form of fines the punisher distributes to other members of her group. The linked punishment-reward set up is...

Studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries. Furthermore, differences in the use and the reaction on the introduction of a norm enforcement mechanism have been documented in cross-cultural studies, recently. We present data which prove that stark...

We test a mechanism whereby groups are formed voluntarily, through the use of voting. These groups play a public-goods game, where efficiency increases with group size (up to a limit, in one treatment). It is feasible to exclude group members, to exit one's group, or to form larger groups...

In negotiated transactions the act of choosing trading partners and “who chooses” creates a bargaining culture that influences trading behavior. Results are presented from experimental markets in which paired buyers and sellers negotiate the repeated sale of units. Relative to a market...

There is ample empirical evidence indicating that a substantial fraction of the population exhibits social preferences. Recent work also shows that social preferences influence the effectiveness of incentives in labor relations. Hence, when making contracting decisions, employers should take...

We propose a new organizing scheme for classifying types of experiments. In addition to the standard categories of laboratory and field experiments, we suggest a new category: “extra-laboratory experiments.” These are experiments that have the same spirit as laboratory experiments, but are...

When we become aware that our past actions carry information about qualities that we possess or lack, which others use to decide how to deal with us, are we unconcerned, content to rely on what we have done, or do we take action to alter this information? We study this question experimentally...