In this experiment I study a novel three-player ultimatum game in which two proposers with unequal amounts of money simultaneously submit offers to one responder, who may accept at most one offer. I compare the predictions of inequity aversion, advantage seeking, and self-interest. Unlike...

In our experiment, a dictator game variant, the reported outcome of a die roll determines the endowment (low/high) in a subsequent dictator game. In one treatment the experimenter is present and no cheating is possible, while in another subjects can enter the result of the roll themselves. Moral...

Evidence suggests that whether or not people dislike lying is situation-dependent. We argue that the theory of simple guilt can accommodate this well.

The market for retail financial products (e.g., investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...

I describe ten situations in which experimental data may provide useful guidance to the study of cheap-talk games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C92, D8.

This paper utilizes data from a laboratory experiment in order to examine the advantages and disadvantages of subjective measures. Our results indicate good and bad news: subjective measures correlate highly with the variables they are designed to capture but they also systematically suffer from...

Prices and quantities converge to the theoretical competitive equilibria in continuous, double auction markets. The double auction is not a tatonnement mechanism. Disequilibrium trades take place. The absence of any influence of disequilibrium trades, which have the capacity to change the...