Are decisions in a trust game more or less sensitive to changes in risk than decisions in a purely financial, non-social decision-making task? Participants in a binary trust game (they could either keep $5 for sure or give it to a trustee with the chance of getting $10 back) were informed that...

We present a new experimental design to test whether the endowment effect exists for exchange goods, like money. We compare three groups to a baseline: one endowed with money, one endowed with chocolate coins, and one endowed with chocolate coins described as “tokens.” We find an endowment...

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been found to play a persistent role for investment behavior under risk. We study whether MLA is already present during adolescence. Quite surprisingly, we find no evidence of MLA in a sample of 755 adolescents. This finding is at odds with previous findings, and...

We explore gender differences in preferences for competition and risk among children aged 9–12 in Colombia and Sweden, two countries differing in gender equality according to macro indices. We include four types of tasks that vary in gender stereotyping when looking at competitiveness:...

Asymmetric information in economic relationships often provides incentives to deceive. Previous findings show that ex ante disclosure of conflicts of interest not only fails to improve these relationships but also leads to even more deception. This study proposes that providing ex post...

We develop and test experimentally the argument that gender/family and/or professional identities, activated through priming, influence preference for competition. We focus on female professionals for whom these identities may conflict and male professionals for whom they may be reinforcing. We...

We study how individuals adjust their judgment of fairness and unfairness when they are in the position of spectators before and after making real decisions, and how this adjustment depends on the actions they take in the game. We find that norms that appear universal instead take into account...

We explore bargaining, using ultimatum games, when one party, the proposer, possesses private information about the pie size and can either misrepresent this information through untruthful statements (explicit deception) or through information-revealing actions (implicit deception). Our study is...

We confront a representative sample of 1102 Dutch individuals with a series of incentivized investment decisions and also elicit their time preferences. There are two treatments that differ in the frequency at which individuals decide about the invested amount. The low frequency treatment...