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Optimal tolerance for failure
Siegert, Caspar; Trepper, Piers - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 109 (2015) C, pp. 41-55
We consider the problem of an employer who has to choose whether to reemploy agents with a positive track record or agents who were unsuccessful. While previously successful managers are likely to be of high ability, they have also accumulated wealth and will be harder to motivate in the future....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190118
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Moral firmness
Shalvi, Shaul; Leiser, David - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93 (2013) C, pp. 400-407
Firm moral judgment deems dishonest acts as categorically wrong, and considers any self-serving justification for them as further dishonesty. People, however, commonly use self-serving justifications in order to feel honest even as they behave dishonestly, indicating reduced moral firmness. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702947
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Innovation and waste in supply chain management
Peitz, Martin; Shin, Dongsoo - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 86 (2013) C, pp. 191-199
We study a supply chain relationship in which the buyer outsources production of a component to the supplier. The buyer also produces a component and combines it with the supplier's input to yield the final output. The supplier can upgrade production of his input via costly innovation. Neither...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010688110
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Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors
Giebe, Thomas; Gürtler, Oliver - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012) 2, pp. 403-420
We analyze optimal contracts in a hierarchy consisting of a principal, a supervisor and an agent. The supervisor is either neutral or altruistic towards the agent, but his preferences are private information. In a model with two supervisor types, we find that the optimal contract may be very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048095
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Repeated moral hazard with a time-inconsistent agent
Yılmaz, Murat - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 95 (2013) C, pp. 70-89
I consider a repeated principal-agent model with moral hazard, in which the agent has βδ-preferences, which are widely used to capture time-inconsistency. I analyze the case where the agent is sophisticated in the sense that he is fully aware of his inconsistent discounting. I characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048185
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The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach
Gürtler, Marc; Gürtler, Oliver - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 135-146
We analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in a model with selfish and fair principals. Fair principals are willing to honor implicit agreements, selfish principals are not. We investigate a separating equilibrium in which principals reveal their type through the contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116892
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Are you a good employee or simply a good guy? Influence costs and contract design
Corgnet, Brice; Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 92 (2013) C, pp. 259-272
We develop a principal–agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent's level of effort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737917
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Health insurance, treatment plan, and delegation to altruistic physician
Liu, Ting; Ma, Ching-to Albert - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 85 (2013) C, pp. 79-96
commitment regimes. In the first, the physician can commit to treatment decisions at the time a payment contract is accepted. In … patient's illness to do so. In the commitment game, the first best is implemented by a single payment contract to all types of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693377
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How to commit (if you must): Commitment contracts and the dual-self model
Peysakhovich, Alexander - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 101 (2014) C, pp. 100-112
do not), and finally carrots allow easy tradeoffs between commitment and flexibility (while sticks and binding …This paper studies how dual-self (Fudenberg and Levine, 2006) decision-makers can use commitment technologies to combat … temptation and implement long-run optimal actions. I consider three types of commitment technologies: carrot contracts (rewards …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942998
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Goal setting and energy conservation
Harding, Matthew; Hsiaw, Alice - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 107 (2014) PA, pp. 209-227
present-biased consumers with reference-dependent preferences. We find that the need for commitment is correlated with program …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011077034