Showing 1 - 10 of 73
I analyze a problem of project selection where two agents, privately informed of both the true value and their bias in favor of their alternatives, make non-verifiable proposals to an uninformed decision-maker. The analysis makes two contributions. First, I examine the consequences of preference...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776750
We consider the problem of an employer who has to choose whether to reemploy agents with a positive track record or agents who were unsuccessful. While previously successful managers are likely to be of high ability, they have also accumulated wealth and will be harder to motivate in the future....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190118
We study delegating a consumer's treatment plan decisions to an altruistic physician. The physician's degree of altruism is his private information. The consumer's illness severity will be learned by the physician, and also will become his private information. Treatments are discrete choices,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693377
This paper considers a two-stage project which requires investments to be made by different agents, who have career concerns, at each stage. The principal needs to decide whether the project should be continued or not after the first-stage outcome is realized. The principal can either keep the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743950
This paper studies how implicit collusion may take place through simple non-exclusive contracting under adverse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743936
, are themselves vulnerable to collusion and extortion. I focus on one such informal monitor – the fair authorities at the … deal with collusion, though it does deal with extortion. I show that there is a collusion-proof equilibrium in an … interact with the Champagne fair authorities’ incentives. This is invulnerable to collusion, extortion and “reverse extortion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048226
We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190130
We analyze the optimal procurement of labor, which can be supplied either internally, based on wage negotiations, or acquired at terms negotiated with an external subcontractor. The novel feature of our model is that the subcontractor's bargaining power is a function of the proportion of output...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573049
We study a supply chain relationship in which the buyer outsources production of a component to the supplier. The buyer also produces a component and combines it with the supplier's input to yield the final output. The supplier can upgrade production of his input via costly innovation. Neither...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010688110
There is ample empirical evidence indicating that a substantial fraction of the population exhibits social preferences. Recent work also shows that social preferences influence the effectiveness of incentives in labor relations. Hence, when making contracting decisions, employers should take...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737912