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Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes
Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Lee, Dongryul; Sheremeta, Roman M. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 92 (2013) C, pp. 94-103
We analyze a group contest in which n groups compete to win a group-specific public good prize. Group sizes can be different and any player may value the prize differently within and across groups. Players exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently. Only the highest effort (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737931
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Learning tastes through social interaction
Hsiaw, Alice - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 107 (2014) PA, pp. 64-85
bundled with a coordination mechanism for its consumers, its value is endogenously determined due to a consumption externality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011077027
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Respect and relational contracts
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie Claire - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012) 1, pp. 286-298
study whether symbolic rewards are used by the employers mainly to praise employees or as a coordination device to build … rewards as a coordination device to initiate relational contracts. Compared to the balanced market condition, assigning …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597454
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On experimental economics and the comparison between the last two versions of Molière's Tartuffe
Crettez, Bertrand; Deloche, Régis - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 87 (2013) C, pp. 66-72
-game communication and one with. In the first game players fail to coordinate to the efficient equilibrium but in the second one they do …, which is consistent with experimental evidence. In the penultimate version of the play, there is pre-game communication in … experimental evidence. By removing the pre-game communication from the first game, Molière adapted his play as if he had been a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010636229
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Behavioral heuristics and market patterns in a Bertrand–Edgeworth game
Heymann, D.; Kawamura, E.; Perazzo, R.; Zimmermann, M.G. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 105 (2014) C, pp. 124-139
This paper studies Bertrand price-setting behavior when firms face capacity constraints (Bertrand–Edgeworth game). This game is known to lack equilibria in pure strategies, while the mixed-strategy equilibria are hard to characterize. We explore families of heuristic rules for individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261611
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Platform selection in the lab
Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; Helland, Leif - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 99 (2014) C, pp. 168-177
game tips almost perfectly to the superior platform. Next, we show that platform coordination fails when seemingly innocent … equilibrium selection theory is unable to account for coordination failure while observed behavior is consistent with non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743944
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Conflict, settlement, and the shadow of the future
McBride, Michael; Skaperdas, Stergios - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 105 (2014) C, pp. 75-89
We examine a conflictual setting in which adversaries cannot contract on an enforcement variable (arms) and where the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. We show that, as the future becomes more important in this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261613
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Commitment problems in conflict resolution
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman M.; … - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) C, pp. 33-45
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263909
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A comprehensive comparison of students and non-students in classic experimental games
Belot, Michele; Duch, Raymond; Miller, Luis - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 113 (2015) C, pp. 26-33
This study exploits the opening of the experimental lab in Oxford to compare the behavior of students and non-students in a number of classic experimental games, some of which involve other-regarding preferences (Trust Game, Dictator Game, and Public Goods Game) and others which have game forms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263910
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Prisoners and their dilemma
Khadjavi, Menusch; Lange, Andreas - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 92 (2013) C, pp. 163-175
We report insights into the behavior of prisoners in dilemma situations that so famously carry their name. We compare female inmates and students in a simultaneous and a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma. In the simultaneous Prisoner's Dilemma, the cooperation rate among inmates exceeds the rate of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737926