We study a class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising agents are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the...

We offer a parsimonious definition of large population potential games, provide some alternate characterizations, and demonstrate the advantages of the new definition over the existing definition, but also show the equivalence of the two definitions.

We consider models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. We introduce committed agents: for each strategy, we suppose that there is at least one agent who plays that strategy without fail. We show that unlike the standard imitative model,...

We consider a discrete choice model in which the payoffs to each of an agentʼs n actions are subjected to the average of m i.i.d. shocks, and use tools from large deviations theory to characterize the rate of decay of the probability of choosing a given suboptimal action as m approaches...