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The value of information under unawareness

Galanis, Spyros - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 384-396

The value of information is examined in a single-agent environment with unawareness. Although the agent has a correct … prior about events he is aware of and has a clear understanding of his available actions and payoffs, his unawareness may … negative, contrasting what is true in the standard model with partitional information and no unawareness. We show that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263576

Equivalence of the information structure with unawareness to the logic of awareness

Heinsalu, Sander - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 6, pp. 2453-2468

This paper proves the Li (2009) [13] unawareness structure equivalent to the single-agent propositionally generated … logic of awareness of Fagin and Halpern (1988) [4]. For any model of one type one can construct a model of the other type … describing the same belief and awareness. Li starts from an agent unable to perceive aspects of the world and distinguish states …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042968

Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs

Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio - In: Journal of Economic Theory 156 (2015) C, pp. 77-102

We study mechanism design in non-Bayesian settings of incomplete information, when the designer has no information about the players, and the players have arbitrary, heterogeneous, first-order, and possibilistic beliefs about their opponents' payoff types.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189740

Ironing without control

Toikka, Juuso - In: Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011) 6, pp. 2510-2526

I extend Myersonʼs [R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73] ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the monotonicity constraint implied by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042952

Does one Bayesian make a difference?

Mueller-Frank, Manuel - In: Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) C, pp. 423-452

This paper develops a model of repeated interaction in social networks among agents with differing degrees of sophistication. The focus of the model is observational learning; that is, each agent receives initial private information and makes inferences regarding the private information of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076679

Strategic stability in Poisson games

De Sinopoli, Francesco; Meroni, Claudia; Pimienta, Carlos - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 46-63

In Poisson games, an extension of perfect equilibrium based on perturbations of the strategy space does not guarantee that players use admissible actions. This observation suggests that such a class of perturbations is not the correct one. We characterize the right space of perturbations to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930789

Minimum cost connection networks: Truth-telling and implementation

Hougaard, Jens Leth; Tvede, Mich - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 76-99

In the present paper we consider the allocation of costs in connection networks. Agents have connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to have connected. Connections between locations are costly to build. The problem is to allocate costs of networks satisfying all connection...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263568

Imitating cooperation and the formation of long-term relationships

Schumacher, Heiner - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 1, pp. 409-417

We study the infinitely repeated prisonerʼs dilemma with the option to maintain or to quit relationships. We show that if agents imitate successful strategies infrequently, defection is not dynamically stable and cooperation emerges regardless of the initial distribution of strategies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042996

The role of commitment in bilateral trade

Gerardi, Dino; Hörner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas - In: Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) C, pp. 578-603

This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes. The seller of a good is informed of its quality, which affects both his cost and the buyer's valuation, but the buyer is not. To...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076671

Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information

Liu, Qingmin - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 49-75

This paper provides an explicit characterization of correlations that are implicitly captured by partition models for incomplete information games. The main result of this paper shows that every partition model for incomplete information can be decomposed into the conjunctions of a unique...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263604

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