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A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations

Kalai, Ehud; Postlewaite, Andrew; Roberts, John - In: Journal of Economic Theory 20 (1979) 1, pp. 13-22

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Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies

Cole, Harold L.; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Journal of Economic Theory 101 (2001) 2, pp. 333-373

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146144

Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: Nonmonotonicity of the core

Kalai, Ehud; Postlewaite, Andrew; Roberts, John - In: Journal of Economic Theory 19 (1978) 1, pp. 200-209

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146272

Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions

Matthews, Steven A.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Journal of Economic Theory 48 (1989) 1, pp. 238-263

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146340

Disadvantageous monopolies and disadvantageous endowments

Dreze, Jacques H.; Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold; … - In: Journal of Economic Theory 16 (1977) 1, pp. 116-121

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Refining cheap-talk equilibria

Matthews, Steven A.; Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro; … - In: Journal of Economic Theory 55 (1991) 2, pp. 247-273

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Disadvantageous syndicates

Postlewaite, Andrew; Rosenthal, Robert W. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 9 (1974) 3, pp. 324-326

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005160024

Implementation in differential information economies

Postlewaite, Andrew; Schmeidler, David - In: Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986) 1, pp. 14-33

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Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 191-212

A repeated game with private monitoring is “close” to a repeated game with public monitoring (or perfect monitoring) when (i) the expected payoff structures are close and (ii) the informational structures are close in the sense that private signals in the private monitoring game can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043051