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Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 104 (2002) 2, pp. 473-478

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005159698

Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 89 (1999) 2, pp. 165-185

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005159814

Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew - In: Journal of Economic Theory 52 (1990) 2, pp. 243-267

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150308

The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 132 (2007) 1, pp. 461-473

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146097

An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 54 (1991) 1, pp. 26-47

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146126

Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 44 (1988) 1, pp. 1-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153373

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

Fudenberg, Drew; Kreps, David M.; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 44 (1988) 2, pp. 354-380

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153917

Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009) 6, pp. 2354-2371

We examine the role of off-path "superstitions" in macro-economics, and show how a false belief about off-path play is the key element underlying both the Lucas Critique and the game-theoretic concept of self-confirming equilibrium. However, the impact of false beliefs in these two cases is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008521007

Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests

Cripps, Martin W.; Dekel, Eddie; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - In: Journal of Economic Theory 121 (2005) 2, pp. 259-272

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153412

Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences

Dekel, Eddie; Safra, Zvi; Segal, Uzi - In: Journal of Economic Theory 55 (1991) 2, pp. 229-246

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153711