Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...

Partial equilibrium analysis has a conceptual dilemma that its object should be negligibly small in order to be free from income effect but then the consumer does not care for it and the notion of willingness to pay for it does not make sense. In the setting of a continuum of commodities, we...

This note shows that for two social welfare functions which are inequality averse with respect to certainty equivalents, if one is more inequality averse for certainty equivalents than the other, the household preference induced by optimally allocating aggregate bundles according to this social...

In formalizing a ‘veil of ignorance’ type procedure, this paper considers how an agentʼs preferences over a set of alternatives change as he is placed at an increasing ‘distance’ from the consequences of his choices. A definition for such ‘removed preferences’ is presented and its...

We study a general equilibrium model with a non-profit firm producing a public good using private goods as inputs which are financed by voluntary contributions (subscriptions) of households. We analyze policy interventions that increase the public good level at subscription equilibria, and show...

The principle of weak monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that the worth of the grand coalition and some player's marginal contribution to all coalitions increase or stay the same, then this player's payoff should not decrease. We investigate the class of values...

This note extends Wiseman [6] to more general reputation games with exogenous learning. Using Gossner's [4] relative entropy method, we provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the long-lived player. The lower bound shows that when the exogenous signals are sufficiently...

When the trading process is characterized by search frictions, traders may be rationed so markets need not clear. We build a general equilibrium model with transferable utility where the uncertainty arising from rationing is incorporated in the definition of a commodity, in the spirit of the...

This paper studies communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any information through cheap talk, and show that when these...

Individuals learn by chit-chatting with others as a by-product of their online and offline activities. Social plugins are an example in the online context: they embed information from a friend, acquaintance or even a stranger on a web page and the information is usually independent of the...