In a setting where an infinite population of players interact locally and repeatedly, we study the impacts of payoff structures and network structures on contagion of a convention beyond 2×2 coordination games. First, we consider the “bilingual game”, where each player chooses one of two...

We consider models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. We introduce committed agents: for each strategy, we suppose that there is at least one agent who plays that strategy without fail. We show that unlike the standard imitative model,...

This paper examines many-player many-action global games with multidimensional state parameters. It establishes that the notion of noise-independent selection introduced by Frankel, Morris and Pauzner [D. Frankel, S. Morris, A. Pauzner, Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic...

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2×2-coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that if agents may only support a limited number of links payoff dominant conventions will emerge in...

We show that local potential maximizer (Morris and Ui (2005) [14]), a generalization of potential maximizer, is stochastically stable in the log-linear dynamic if the payoff functions are, or the associated local potential is, supermodular. Thus an equilibrium selection result similar to those...

Global games are widely used to predict behaviour in games with strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria. We establish two results on the global game selection. First, we show that, for any supermodular complete information game, the global game selection is independent of the payoff...