We characterize the boundaries of the set of transfers (extremal transfers) implementing a given allocation rule without imposing any assumptions on the agentʼs type space or utility function besides quasi-linearity. Exploiting the concept of extremal transfers allows us to obtain an exact...

We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements. In particular, we characterize the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an informed agent if, having observed the agent's...

In a class of informed principal problems with common values, we define iteratively a particular allocation which we call the assured allocation. It is comparatively easy to calculate and straightforward to interpret. It always exists, is unique and continuous in the priors. It is undominated,...

We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents' values are drawn independently from a distribution, the Bayesian optimal mechanism is...

This essay introduces the symposium on computer science and economic theory.

The framework of incentive compatible finite direct coordination mechanisms in the sense of Myerson (1982) [5] is isomorphic to a framework of incentive compatible stochastic mediated contracts in the sense of Rahman and Obara (2010) [11] and Rahman (2009) [10]. The equivalence follows because...

We consider environments in which agents other than innovator receive the signals about the quality of innovation. We study whether mechanisms can be found which exploit market information to provide appropriate incentives for innovation. If such mechanisms are used, the innovator has incentives...

Using a mechanism design framework, we characterize how a profit-maximizing intermediary can design matching markets when each agent is privately informed about his quality as a partner. Sufficient conditions are provided that ensure a version of positive assortative matching (what we call...

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in auction settings with ‘rich’ type spaces, where bidders obtain information from sources other than their own valuation. By considering a relaxed problem, we provide an upper bound on revenue extraction that explicitly builds on the richness of...

We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and...