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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146100
Any absolutely continuous, piecewise smooth, symmetric two-player game can be extended to define a population game in which each player interacts with a large representative subset of the entire population. Assuming that players respond to the payoff gradient over a continuous action space, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662407
Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk–Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576559
We explore the stability of imitation in a 1200-period experimental Cournot game where subjects do not know the payoff function but see the output quantities and payoffs of each oligopolist after every period. In line with theoretical predictions and previous experimental findings, our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189751
We report experiments studying mixed strategy Nash equilibria that are theoretically stable or unstable under learning. The Time Average Shapley Polygon (TASP) predicts behavior in the unstable case. We study two versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors that include a fourth strategy, Dumb. The unique...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860938