Similar Search Results - EconBiz

The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions

Lopomo, Giuseppe - In: Journal of Economic Theory 82 (1998) 1, pp. 144-166

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005160104

Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard

Lopomo, Giuseppe; Rigotti, Luca; Shannon, Chris - In: Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011) 3, pp. 1148-1172

This paper presents a principal-agent model in which the agent has imprecise beliefs. We model this situation formally by assuming the agent[modifier letter apostrophe]s preferences are incomplete as in Bewley (1986) [2]. In this setting, incentives must be robust to Knightian uncertainty. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009194567

Bidder collusion

Marshall, Robert C.; Marx, Leslie M. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 133 (2007) 1, pp. 374-402

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005117663

Implementation with Extensive Form Games: One Round of Signaling Is Not Enough

Brusco, Sandro - In: Journal of Economic Theory 87 (1999) 2, pp. 356-378

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153916

Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments

Brusco, Sandro - In: Journal of Economic Theory 129 (2006) 1, pp. 1-30

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112312

The Optimal Design of a Market

Brusco, Sandro; Jackson, Matthew O. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 88 (1999) 1, pp. 1-39

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005058554

Unique Implementation of the Full Surplus Extraction Outcome in Auctions with Correlated Types

Brusco, Sandro - In: Journal of Economic Theory 80 (1998) 2, pp. 185-200

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005159341

Implementing Action Profiles when Agents Collude

Brusco, Sandro - In: Journal of Economic Theory 73 (1997) 2, pp. 395-424

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005160043

A service of the