This introduces the symposium on general equilibrium.

This paper analyzes the stability of the (Pareto efficient) nonsunspot equilibria as a function of the constraints faced by consumers in their ability to transfer wealth between states of nature. Equilibria that are stable for the certainty economy define nonsunspot equilibria that are stable in...

In most electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers to a uniform price auction. These markets are often modelled as simpler pure-strategy Supply Function Equilibria (SFE) with continuous supply functions. Critics argue that the discreteness and discontinuity of the required...

Harsányi [4] showed that Bayesian games over finite games of payoff uncertainty with finite sets of belief types always admit Bayesian equilibria. That still left the question of whether Bayesian games over finite games of payoff uncertainty with infinitely many types are guaranteed to have...

We present a substantive and far-reaching generalization of the principal results in the economics of forestry, as formalized by Mitra and Wan (1986). Rather than a polarized dichotomy of linear and strictly concave, differentiable benefit (felicity) functions, we develop the theory in the...

We re-examine the destabilizing role of balanced-budget fiscal policy rules based on consumption taxation. Using a one-sector model with infinitely-lived households, we consider a specification of preferences derived from Jaimovich (2008) [14] and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) [15] which is...

This study proves various global stability results for unbounded optimal growth models. The main theorem states that any optimal path will eventually be in the neighborhood of a balanced growth path if future utility is sufficiently weakly discounted. The assumptions allow for non-smooth...

We study a class of infinite horizon, discounted stochastic games with strategic complementarities. In our class of games, we prove the existence of a stationary Markov Nash equilibrium, as well as provide methods for constructing this least and greatest equilibrium via a simple successive...

Continuous-time game dynamics are typically first order systems where payoffs determine the growth rate of the playersʼ strategy shares. In this paper, we investigate what happens beyond first order by viewing payoffs as higher order forces of change, specifying e.g. the acceleration of the...

We present a comprehensive theory of large games in which players have names and determinate social-types and/or biological traits, and identify through four decisive examples, essentially based on a matching-pennies type game, pathologies arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for...