Using a theoretical model that incorporates asymmetric information and differing comparative advantages among lenders, this paper analyzes the impact of lender entry on credit access and aggregate net output. The model shows that lender entry has the potential to create a segmented market that...

We examine the validity of a macroeconomic version of the Modigliani–Miller theorem. By this, we mean that different capital structures can occur in equilibrium and that all of them are associated with the same allocation of commodities and the same welfare. We develop a general equilibrium...

We model a financial market in which companies engage in strategic financial reporting knowing that investors only pay attention to a randomly drawn sample from firms' reports and extrapolate from this sample. We investigate the extent to which stock prices differ from the fundamental values,...

We construct a budget-balanced wagering mechanism that flexibly extracts information about event probabilities, as well as the mean, median, and other statistics from a group of individuals whose beliefs are immutable to the actions of others. We show how our mechanism, called the Brier betting...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium demand and risk premiums in the presence of skewness risk. We extend the classical mean-variance two-fund separation theorem to a three-fund separation theorem. The additional fund is the skewness portfolio, i.e. a portfolio that gives the optimal hedge...

This paper develops a model of credit-driven bubbles and asks when it gives rise to the patterns that policymakers often use to gauge the presence of a bubble. The model suggests patterns like rapid price appreciation and speculative trade do not always occur whenever a bubble is present, but...

In this paper we examine the effects of default and collateral on risk sharing. We assume that there is a large set of assets which all promise a risk less payoff but which distinguish themselves by their collateral requirements. In equilibrium agents default, the assets have different payoffs,...

We study financial markets where agents share risks, but have incentives to default and their financial positions might not be transparent, that is, might not be mutually observable. We show that a lack of position transparency results in a counterparty risk externality, that manifests itself in...

We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors differ with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also in...

By introducing repo markets we understand how agents need to borrow issued securities before shorting them: (re)-hypothecation is at the heart of shorting. Non-negative amounts of securities in the box of an agent (amounts borrowed or owned but not lent on) can be sold, and recursive use of...