This paper studies pairwise comparison dynamics for population games with continuous strategy space. We show that the pairwise comparison dynamic is well-defined if certain mild Lipschitz continuity conditions are satisfied. We establish Nash stationarity and positive correlation for pairwise...

We consider a two-player Prisoner's Dilemma type game with continuous actions, where players choose how much to contribute to a public project. This game is played infinitely many times and actions are irreversible: players cannot decrease their actions over time. While it is strictly dominant...

In a setting where an infinite population of players interact locally and repeatedly, we study the impacts of payoff structures and network structures on contagion of a convention beyond 2×2 coordination games. First, we consider the “bilingual game”, where each player chooses one of two...

This study considers waiting times for populations to achieve efficient social coordination. Belloc and Bowles [1] conjecture that coalitional behavior will hasten such coordination. This turns out to be true when every member of the population interacts with every other member, but does not...

This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.

The paper presents a dynamic model of neighborhood segregation where fee motivated real estate brokers match sellers optimally either to minority or to white buyers. In an initially all-white neighborhood, real estate brokers thus either keep the neighborhood in a steady-state white equilibrium...

We consider models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. We introduce committed agents: for each strategy, we suppose that there is at least one agent who plays that strategy without fail. We show that unlike the standard imitative model,...

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities, and we assume...

This paper demonstrates the theoretical foundation that underlies the willingness of rational arbitrageurs to delay and reinforce the speculative attack. The key assumptions are that there is a small probability that arbitrageurs are behavioral and never time the market of their own accord and...

We examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth for a durable goods monopoly. The seller may offer any bundle(s) of current and previous quality improvements (upgrades). Subgame perfect equilibrium seller payoffs range from capturing the full social surplus down to only the initial flow...