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Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning
Hu, Ju - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 64-73
This note extends Wiseman [6] to more general reputation games with exogenous learning. Using Gossner's [4] relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930785
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Information percolation in segmented markets
Duffie, Darrell; Malamud, Semyon; Manso, Gustavo - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 1-32
trading opportunities. We characterize endogenous information acquisition and show how learning externalities affect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042991
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Dynamic pricing in the presence of individual learning
Weng, Xi - In: Journal of Economic Theory 155 (2015) C, pp. 262-299
own experiences about the effectiveness of the product. Individual learning generates ex post heterogeneity, which affects … the buyers' purchasing decisions, the monopolist's pricing strategy, and efficiency. When learning occurs through good … exploration. When learning occurs through bad news signals, ex post heterogeneity has no such effect, since only homogeneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189761
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Optimal entry timing
Kolb, Aaron M. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 973-1000
A player of privately known strength chooses when to enter a market, and an incumbent chooses whether to compete or concede. Information about the potential entrant's type is revealed publicly according to an exogenous news process and the timing of entry. I analyze stationary equilibria using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263574
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Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 553-605
We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage-game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage-game actions of player one perfectly. Player one's type is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263579
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Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games
Oyama, Daisuke; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 100-127
In a setting where an infinite population of players interact locally and repeatedly, we study the impacts of payoff structures and network structures on contagion of a convention beyond 2×2 coordination games. First, we consider the “bilingual game”, where each player chooses one of two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263580
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Commodity money with frequent search
Oberfield, Ezra; Trachter, Nicholas - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 6, pp. 2332-2356
A prominent feature of the Kiyotaki–Wright model of commodity money is multiplicity of dynamic equilibria. We show that the extent of multiplicity hinges on the frequency of search. Holding fixed the average number of meetings over time, we vary search frequency by altering the interval...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594318
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Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization
Said, Maher - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 6, pp. 2419-2438
A seller has an uncertain number of perishable goods to sell in each period. Privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to the market. Buyers are risk neutral, patient, and have persistent private values for consuming a single unit. We show that the seller can implement the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594324
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Dynamic sender–receiver games
Renault, Jérôme; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 2, pp. 502-534
We consider a dynamic version of sender–receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662408
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A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 1, pp. 376-392
We establish reputation results, under two sided incomplete information, for a class of repeated games. We consider a repeated game that satisfies the assumptions of either Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) [3] or Cripps et al. (2005) [6] and we assume that both players are Stackelberg types with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042918