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When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - In: Journal of Economic Theory 79 (1998) 1, pp. 46-71

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112282

Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games,

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David - In: Journal of Economic Theory 31 (1983) 2, pp. 251-268

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112470

Limit games and limit equilibria

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David - In: Journal of Economic Theory 38 (1986) 2, pp. 261-279

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005117586

Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game

Johnson, Philip; Levine, David K.; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - In: Journal of Economic Theory 100 (2001) 1, pp. 1-21

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153318

Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests

Cripps, Martin W.; Dekel, Eddie; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - In: Journal of Economic Theory 121 (2005) 2, pp. 259-272

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153412

Reputation in Dynamic Games

Celentani, Marco; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - In: Journal of Economic Theory 70 (1996) 1, pp. 109-132

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005111995

Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters

Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - In: Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009) 1, pp. 146-174

We analyze candidate competition when some voters do not observe a candidate's policy choice. Voters have a personality preference when both candidates offer the same policy. In equilibrium, the candidate with a personality advantage may get elected with a partisan policy even though his...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112148

The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 132 (2007) 1, pp. 461-473

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146097

An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 54 (1991) 1, pp. 26-47

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146126

On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games

Fudenberg, Drew; Maskin, Eric - In: Journal of Economic Theory 53 (1991) 2, pp. 428-438

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146280