Who will win the bidding to become the sole producer of a new product: the monopolist of a related product or a new entrant? When there exists potential entry to the monopolist's existing business, the standard result that monopoly persists (1982) may or may not hold, depending crucially on how...

We examine the impact of vertical industry structure on upstream process innovation. We find that vertical integration (VI) generally enhances innovation under downstream Cournot competition, but can diminish innovation under downstream Bertrand competition. We also find that under Bertrand...

This paper considers variants of a dynamic duopoly model where one firm has a stronger market position than its competitor. Consumers' past purchases may reveal their different valuations for the two firms' products. Price discrimination based on purchase histories tends to benefit consumers if...

We discuss the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist when the firm has private information about cost or demand conditions. The regulator offers the firm a set of prices from which to choose. When there is private information only about costs, the firm should always have a degree of discretion...

The Baumol-Willig efficient component pricing rule states that it is efficient to set the price of access to an essential facility equal to the direct cost of access plus the opportunity cost to the integrated access provider. The authors analyze the relevant notion of 'opportunity cost' under...

This note extends the analysis of M. Armstrong, C. Doyle, and J. Vickers (1996) to the case of retail price deregulation. It is shown that the optimal access price may be above, below, or (in the linear case) equal to marginal cost; that optimal regulation of the margin between the retail price...

This paper analyzes some effects of price discrimination policy in a model where a dominant incumbent firm faces an endogenous degree of competition in one of its two markets. Banning price discrimination tends to encourage more entry, which is desirable if the entrant is as efficient as the...