We apply a model with two types of labour where each group decides on whether it prefers to be represented by an independent craft-specific labour union or by a joint union. Applying the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, we find that it is beneficial for at least one group of labourers to...

We offer a unified framework to analyse the determination of employment, employee effort, wages, and profit sharing when firms face stochastic revenue shocks. We apply a generalized Nash bargaining solution, which extends the wage bargaining literature by incorporating efficiency-wage...

We analyse the effects of the unionisation structure on the incentive for outward foreign direct investment (FDI) and on union utility. The incentive for outward FDI is higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions, irrespective of the number of firms in the industry. If the...

This paper examines interactions between wage bargaining, unemployment, and growth. In the basic model, wage bargaining determines unemployment and is not influenced by growth. An increase in unemployment benefits increases unemployment and reduces capital accumulation. In a neoclassical...

Can lobbying internalize cross-national externalities? This paper investigates this in a two-country economy where governments regulate labour markets through national labour standards, but are subject to lobbying. We study four different lobbying architectures and show that cross-national...

Manning rules specify the number of workers assigned to a machine or operation. If unions and firms bargain over manning rules (instead of only over wages), employment rises for a given capital stock. In this paper, we extend the analysis to endogenous capital formation. Our analysis suggests...

If workers gain an insider position through past activity, young workers will bear the resulting outsider unemployment burden. In a world where productivity of employed workers rises because of learning-by-doing, and where labor demand is sufficiently elastic, preventing this unemployment (by...

This paper studies the interaction between trade unions, which set wages, and a policymaker, who decides on the level of unemployment benefits and taxes. If the policymaker cannot commit to future policies, taxes and benefits are excessively high in equilibrium. Moreover, employment and output...

This paper examines the centralization of collective bargaining where unions are Stackelberg leaders, firms invest in capital and purchase intermediate goods from each other, and where learning-by-investment causes persistent technological change. The main finding is the following. Provided that...

We analyse the influence of wage bargaining on the firm´s research incentive. In a duopoly setting, firms invest resources into a Reinganum-type patent race. The wage is bargained for with a union. Besides the holdup and the strategic effect, which have been analysed before, we are able to...