Escalating penalties for repeat offenders are a pervasive feature of punishment schemes in various contexts, but economic theory has had a hard time rationalizing the practice. This paper reviews the literature on escalating penalties, and then develops a theory based on uncertainty on the part...

This paper contributes to the interpretation of the standard of proof in criminal trials in two ways. First, it provides a purely utilitarian explanation as to why there are asymmetric costs associated with false convictions and acquittals. It relies on the fact that noncriminals may engage in...

This article considers how judges' political and racial backgrounds intersect with offender race under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Using variation in judges' political affiliation and race at the district level and significant changes to Guidelines enforcement, I find that...

This article asks which wrong doings should be considered criminal and which should be handled in some different manner. The answer is that when the state's commitment power is needed to provide deterrence, a wrong doing should be considered criminal. When, however, private parties can take...

The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a...

The paper uses the findings of psychology, behavioral economics, and behavioral ethics to revisit three main related assumptions of the rational-choice approach to equity, by developing three main points: first, not only bad people try to circumvent the law; second, behavior depends on the...

This paper presents a theoretical model in which governments regulate economic activity and individuals bypass the regulations by paying bribes to the public officials who monitor their businesses; the amount of the bribe is the subject of bargaining. The paper then introduces a policy that...

We claim that Posner's nuisance rule maintains the efficiency feature even under severe informational asymmetry. This paper, as a critical assessment of an overly complicated order-reporting mechanism by Kim [2002], argues that Posner's original value-reporting mechanism alone is enough to...

In trials witnesses often slant their testimony in order to advance their own interests. To obtain truthful testimony, the law relies on cross-examination under threat of prosecution for perjury. We show that perjury law is an imperfect truthrevealing mechanism. Moreover, we develop a...

Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules,...