Over the past 20 years, democracy promotion has become a pillar of USAID´s mission. We assess the success of US aid by testing whether it is enhancing democracy in a panel of 26 transition countries. Using Freedom House Nations in Transit data, we find that aid has generally not been a...

Review of: James Buchanans konstitutionelle Ökonomik. Ed. by Ingo Pies, Martin Leschke. 1996. Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen

The US deficit on current account is frequently considered to be a problem of the US. A recently published paper by BATRA and BELADI [1996] is a case in point. By drawing on a revealed preference framework they claim that it might be better for the US to impose trade restrictions in order to...

Even if contract enforcers are as opportunistic as ordinary traders, a system of adjudication can increase the degree to which contractual obligations on large anonymous markets are fulfilled. Only if arbitrators receive a fixed income, occasional mistakes will not favour the untrustworthy. It...

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids, which, together with the...

Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. Here, we investigate procedural fairness as in Güth (2011). In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario...

We present an overlapping-generations model with two interacting teams, where young team members earn an income, whereas old team members depend on either intrateam transfers from young members (voluntary solidarity) or tax-financed transfers (compulsory solidarity). We derive the individually...

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Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthily and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players...