We analyse a cheap-talk game where contrasting lobbies are asymmetrically informed. Equilibrium information transmission depends on each lobby's preference alignment with the legislator on the dimension of its expertise, and on the conflict of lobby interests. Full revelation is possible only...

With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by government members with heterogeneous policy preferences, it may become...

The consequences of strike ballots are analysed in a non-cooperative model of negotiations between a union and a firm over wage increases. The firm possesses private information about its revenues. The union can only stop the firm from rejecting wage demands if a refusal is costly, due to a...

This paper develops a theory to explain growth in developed and undeveloped countries. Where transaction and information costs are low, people more easily perceive and oppose activities conducive to deadweight losses. The opposite holds where information and transaction costs are high, because...

We present an overlapping-generations model with two interacting teams, where young team members earn an income, whereas old team members depend on either intrateam transfers from young members (voluntary solidarity) or tax-financed transfers (compulsory solidarity). We derive the individually...

We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game. We show that this game possesses...

This paper tests the explanatory power of alternative theories on the determinants of judiciary independence using annual and decision-based data on the Italian Constitutional Court. The estimates show that structural measures of judiciary independence, such as the share of constitutional judges...

The paper analyses the process of coalition formation among political parties using game-theoretic concepts. Two different motives determining that process are distinguished: the parties' preferences over alternative policies and the politicians' desire to get into office. Based on these...

In this paper we focus on a few broad analytical themes that have not been paid enough attention in the theoretical institutional economics literature: in particular, (a) the process of persistence of dysfunctional institutions in poor countries, (b) institutional impediments as strategic...

The efficiency hypothesis of institutional change is formulated in a general economic setting. The validity of this hypothesis depends on the specification of the new institution and the political process governing the institutional change. The issue is formulated as an implementation problem...