We explore the sensitivity of the clinical decisions of physicians to the standards of care expected of them under the law, drawing on the abandonment by states over time of rules holding physicians to standards determined by local customs and the contemporaneous adoption of national-standard...

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker acknowledged that empirical studies undercut criticism of punitive damages. Paradoxically, the Court simultaneously expressed concern about jury predictability based on a high and variable punitive-compensatory ratio published in an article by the present authors. The...

The Learned Hand formula is enshrined in the law-and-economics literature as the centerpiece of the courts´ way of determining negligence. The orthodox interpretation of it is the conditional application of the Hand formula contingent on the other party´s assumed efficient behavior. Reviewing...

We examine the link between innovative activity on the part of firms, the competitive pressure to introduce innovations, and optimal damages awards. While innovative activity brings forth valuable new products for consumers, competitive pressure in the ensuing innovation race induces firms to...

The paper compares two liability rules, strict liability and the negligence rule, in terms of loss-prevention investment and social welfare when individuals are risk-averse and policymakers do not have lump-sum transfers at their disposal. If the damage payment made by the injurer to the victim...

This paper studies a unilateral accident model in which potentially judgment-proof agents (agents who may have insufficient assets to satisfy a judgment against them) choose levels of both monetary and nonmonetary care. We show that (i) monetary care may exceed its first-best level under both...

This paper revisits the accident model at its roots and shows that the intensity principle provides a powerful analytical tool to handle a variety of issues in a unifying frame and based on common intuition. If courts impose inefficient standards, if a cap on liability exists, or if the...

Shavell (1980) established that tort regimes fail to incentivize optimal activity levels. The bearer of residual loss adopts a socially optimal activity level; however, the nonbearer of residual loss will adopt an excessive level. We explore alternative liability rules, which distribute the cost...

We analyze liability law when the value of the good at risk has an influence on the consumer's social status. It is first established that standard liability rules fail to induce efficient choices. We argue that standard negligence will tend to outperform standard strict liability. Next, we...