We ask how to regulate pecuniary private benefit consumption. These benefits can compensate controlling shareholders for monitoring managers and investing effort in implementing projects. Controlling shareholders may consume excessive benefits, however. We argue (a) ex post judicial review of...

We identify conditions under which a bargainer makes inefficiently large (small) investments in a search for information about the opponent's reservation price. The analysis starts with the observation that a player will invest too much (too little) if the opponent's expected payoff is...

Two theorems are presented that show the following: Assume that preferences are influenced by past consumption. If and only if preferences are adaptive, it is the case that all improvement sequences are acyclic and thus can be a basis for doing welfare economics. It is further argued that...

Definitive judgment about the quality of decision-making is made difficult by twin problems of measurement and identification. A measure of decision-making quality is hard to formalize, to quantify, and to make practical for use in a variety of choice environments; and it is difficult to...

This paper develops a new argument for the Chinese Communist Party´s success in implementing the post-Mao economic reform. We build a three-player political agency model, showing that the credibility of the threats of deposition by the selectorate and of revolts by citizens are both crucial...

Internal organization relies heavily on psychological consistency requirements. This perspective has been emphasized in modern compensation theory, but has not been extended to organization theory. The idea is developed by starting from Williamson's discussion of idiosyncratic exchange. The...

We experimentally analyze whether being exposed to different incentive schemes induces subjects to change their behavior. In particular, we investigate the effect on trust and trustworthiness measured by conducting an investment game. We implement two simple incentive schemes modeling the basic...

We consider a dismissal tournament where the loser gets fired. Although the firm takes possible selection failures into account when choosing the optimal tournament design, the selection efficiency of a dismissal tournament is often rather low. This is because low-ability workers, possessing...