From a game-theoretic point of view, fraudulent accounting to embellish the financial status of a firm and the use of drugs to enhance performance in sports are very similar. We study the replicator dynamics of such games. We allow for heterogeneous populations, such as highly talented versus...

This paper studies the emergence of firm asymmetry as an equilibrium outcome. We consider differentiated Cournot and Bertrand duopolies where firms endogenously select their organizational governance and their timing strategy. For Cournot competition asymmetric and symmetric equilibria may...

We ask how bargainers' incentives to communicate about more efficient widget designs depend on whether they negotiate price prior to, or after, fixing the traded design. We find three effects: (1) Since communication reveals information about preferences, bargainers with little power prefer to...

This paper contributes to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts. In a holdup framework, we provide two sets of conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem. In cases where overinvestment can be ruled out, delegation...

Internal organization relies heavily on psychological consistency requirements. This perspective has been emphasized in modern compensation theory, but has not been extended to organization theory. The idea is developed by starting from Williamson's discussion of idiosyncratic exchange. The...

We investigate factors influencing the choice of liability status by the owners of start-up firms. We propose a theoretical model that encompasses risk aversion, as well as differentials across liability states in the cost of capital and tax rates, as reasons why entrepreneurs choose one...

This paper analyzes the recent progress in the understanding of a class of organizations known as hybrid forms. The growing literature on these forms, standing between markets and hierarchies, raises important questions about their nature and role in a market economy. Adopting a transaction-cost...

This paper develops a theoretical model that determines the optimal ownership arrangement in an imperfect market and government institutional environment, especially in transitional economies. It studies the interdependence of institutional environments and ownership arrangements. The theory...

The O-ring theory is used to analyze the emergence of firms organized as partnerships. The owner-managers of such entrepreneurial firms benefit from ability matching within their production teams. However, they must bear the project risk. Risk aversion then induces a second-best solution....

The traditional concentration of basic research activities in academic settings, with applied research more prevalent in industrial settings, is a distinguishing feature of science and technology markets. This structure arises from a unique combination of product characteristics, and in turn it...