The Learned Hand formula is enshrined in the law-and-economics literature as the centerpiece of the courts´ way of determining negligence. The orthodox interpretation of it is the conditional application of the Hand formula contingent on the other party´s assumed efficient behavior. Reviewing...

We examine the link between innovative activity on the part of firms, the competitive pressure to introduce innovations, and optimal damages awards. While innovative activity brings forth valuable new products for consumers, competitive pressure in the ensuing innovation race induces firms to...

We analyze liability law when the value of the good at risk has an influence on the consumer's social status. It is first established that standard liability rules fail to induce efficient choices. We argue that standard negligence will tend to outperform standard strict liability. Next, we...

We consider the convergence properties of behavior under a comparative negligence rule (CN) and under a rule of negligence with contributory negligence (NCN), assuming bilateral care with three care levels. Using an evolutionary model, we show that CN reduces the proportion of the population...

The existing literature postulates that in nuisance suits courts should balance, for a property right under conflict, several values of the litigating parties. This practice, however, is controversial, mainly due to courts´ resource scarcity. This paper suggests an alternative institutional...

The economic analysis of tort law is extended to multi-party accidents with unobservable actions. Due to the requirement of no punitive damages, the problem resembles a team production problem. It is shown that asymmetry in the agents' impact on the stochastic damage function can be exploited to...

We claim that Posner's nuisance rule maintains the efficiency feature even under severe informational asymmetry. This paper, as a critical assessment of an overly complicated order-reporting mechanism by Kim [2002], argues that Posner's original value-reporting mechanism alone is enough to...

Wrongful convictions may increase the level of crime over the ideal case of their absence. The problem of wrongful conviction is most serious in areas where crime is endemic and for certain groups of citizens who are stereotyped. State liability mitigates this problem; compensating the...

We examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a privately-observed safety attribute. Costly disclosure and price-signaling of safety are alternative firm strategies. The liability system and production cost determine the firm's full marginal cost. When the firm's full marginal...

This article asks which wrong doings should be considered criminal and which should be handled in some different manner. The answer is that when the state's commitment power is needed to provide deterrence, a wrong doing should be considered criminal. When, however, private parties can take...