This article compares various measures of on-the-job training, from a new source that matches establishments and workers, allowing the authors to compare the responses of employers and employees to identical training questions. Establishments report 25 percent more hours of training than do...

An employer must choose a procedure for screening job applicants, a rate of hire, a training program for new employees, a criterion for the retention of new employees after observing their on-the-job performance, a compensati on package, and a rate of capital investment so as to minimize...

Conventional analysis predicts that workers pay part of their on-the-job training costs by accepting a lower starting wage and subsequently realize a return to this investment in the form of greater wage growth. Missing from the conventional treatment of on-the-job training is a discussion of...

In this paper the author examines the effect of the current social security system on the structure of compensation that a wealth- maximizing worker selects. It is shown that the current method of benef it determination encourages an upward-sloping wage profile and that the social security...

The author constructs an equilibrium search model where some employers have a distaste for hiring minority workers and shows that this bias results in economic discrimination against minority workers. Although only unprejudiced firms hire minority workers, minority workers receive lower wages...

The authors investigate the role of peer pressure in influencing the optimal incentive scheme offered to workers engaged in team production. They develop an agency model of peer policing to identify factors that affect the extent of mutual monitoring. As the principal must compensate workers for...