Unlike previous research which had focused solely on principal-agent conflicts in the Middle East, this paper enriches corporate governance literature of privately-held family firms in an emerging economy with inadequate legislative and enforcement framework, by examining conflicts between...

This paper investigates the effects of very highly concentrated ownership structures on the liquidity of stock markets in a context of weak protection for minority shareholders. Such structures are prevalent in a number of European markets as well as in various developing markets, as opposed to...

Prior studies show that agency conflicts are important in explaining corporate financial policies and that the board of directors is central to corporate governance. In this study, we examine the role of this governing body in the accumulation of cash reserves. Using a sample of 597 French...

This paper investigates audit committee (AC) practices in relation to the oversight of financial reporting and external auditors. We conducted semi-structured interviews of Polish public interest entities to explore AC processes in a different environment from the widely researched...

This paper extends research on the corporate governance practices of transitional economies by examining whether the ability of the audit committee to constrain earnings management in Chinese firms is associated with the listing environment and the presence of government officials on the audit...

The Belgian Corporate Governance Code was published in 2004 and updated in 2009 to provide standards of good practice. Since 2008, Belgian law has imposed the creation of an audit committee for all listed firms. There are many published, empirical studies that focus on the relationship between...

Ownership has been identified as a key mechanism in corporate governance. Agency theory suggests that high levels of ownership provide increased incentive for shareholders to monitor firm management which should lead to better firm performance. However, not every shareholder may have the same...

Most regulations and corporate governance codes emphasize the adjective independent next to the words auditor and director because auditor and director independence is expected to result in better protection for shareholders and other stakeholders. In this study we use (1) the extent to which...