In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2010) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak...

We show that the full version of the so-called ‘rural hospital theorem’ generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents’ preferences satisfy...

In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. Ergin (2002) formulates consistency as a local property based...