It is proved that every strategy-proof, peaks-only or unanimous, probabilistic rule defined over a minimally rich domain of single-peaked preferences is a probability mixture of strategy-proof, peaks-only or unanimous, deterministic rules over the same domain. The proof employs Farkas’ Lemma...

In spatial environments we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Individual preferences measure distances between alternatives according to the lp-norm (for a fixed 1=p=[infinity]). When the policy space...

Following prospect theory and in particular the concept of loss aversion, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we consider decision making under risk in which the decision maker’s preferences depend on a reference outcome. An outcome below this reference outcome is regarded as resulting...

Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. Single-dipped and single-basined preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-basinedness in a...