The shadow price of a productive good is equal to its money price less its marginal product. As more of the good is consumed, its shadow price rises because of diminishing productivity and the consumer's full income also rises because the marginal product is positive. The direction of the...

We present a model of delegation with self-interested and privately informed experts. A team of experts with extreme but opposite biases is acceptable to a wide range of decision makers with diverse preferences, but the value of expertise from such a team is low. A decision maker wants to...

This paper discusses the implications of rationing by waiting when consumers have different time costs and personal valuation. The joint distribution function of time costs and personal valuations is used to characterize market equilibrium. It is argued that, under certain conditions, an...

In an assignment market with uncertainty regarding productive ability of participants, early contracting can occur as participants balance risk sharing and sorting efficiency. More promising agents may contract early with each other because insurance gains outweigh sorting inefficiency, whereas...