We explore the characteristics of Pareto-optimal allocations in the context of local public goods or clubs. A set of first-order conditions for Pareto optimality is provided. Classical treatments apparently neglect an important term related to migrant compensation, and thus are incorrect. A...

We reconsider Laussel and Palfrey's analysis of private provision of discrete public goods via the subscription game. We show their semi-regular equilibria do not exist, casting doubt on their efficiency analysis. Taking players' values for the public good as uniformly distributed on <formula format="inline"> <file name="jpet_375_mu1.gif" type="gif" /> </formula>, we...

Suggested contributions, membership categories, and discrete, incremental thank you gifts are devices often used by benevolent associations that provide public goods. Such devices focus donations at discrete levels, thereby effectively limiting the donors' freedom to give. We study the effects...