We reconsider Laussel and Palfrey's analysis of private provision of discrete public goods via the subscription game. We show their semi-regular equilibria do not exist, casting doubt on their efficiency analysis. Taking players' values for the public good as uniformly distributed on <formula format="inline"> <file name="jpet_375_mu1.gif" type="gif" /> </formula>, we...

Suggested contributions, membership categories, and discrete, incremental thank you gifts are devices often used by benevolent associations that provide public goods. Such devices focus donations at discrete levels, thereby effectively limiting the donors' freedom to give. We study the effects...

We consider ultimatum bargaining between a seller and a buyer of an asset. They know each other's valuation of the asset. Both can defer their decisions to delegates. These delegates have opaque preferences. Seller and buyer choose the opacity of their delegate. For the seller's delegate this...