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Redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions

Campante, Filipe R. - In: Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011) 7, pp. 646-656

I propose a framework in which individual political participation can take two distinct forms, voting and contributing … shows that, even though each contribution has a negligible impact, the interaction between contributions and voting leads to … elections. In particular, inequality increases contributions to Republicans, but not to Democrats, as predicted by the model. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574319

Media markets, special interests, and voters

Fergusson, Leopoldo - In: Journal of Public Economics 109 (2014) C, pp. 13-26

states' politics and elections. Thus, if citizens punish political capture, increases in concentration of special interest …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010730186

Media and gridlock

Stone, Daniel F. - In: Journal of Public Economics 101 (2013) C, pp. 94-104

I develop a model of the relation between the media environment and political obstructionism. I show that when voters are less informed by media, obstructionism becomes a more effective political signal for the minority party. The model thus implies that media change can cause gridlock via...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664742

Sequential voting in large elections with multiple candidates

Hummel, Patrick - In: Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012) 3, pp. 341-348

I analyze strategic voting incentives in large elections with three candidates when voting takes place sequentially …' preferences are drawn. If a candidate finishes last in an early voting round, voters deduce that this candidate is likely to be … less popular amongst the remaining voters, and the remaining voters almost always have an incentive to stop voting for this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574346

Redistribution and market efficiency: An experimental study

Großer, Jens; Reuben, Ernesto - In: Journal of Public Economics 101 (2013) C, pp. 39-52

We study the interaction between competitive markets and income redistribution that reallocates unequal pre-tax market incomes away from the rich to the poor majority. In one setup, participants earn their income by trading in a double auction (DA) with exogenous zero or full redistribution. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056101

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Glaeser, Edward L.; Ponzetto, Giacomo A.M. - In: Journal of Public Economics 116 (2014) C, pp. 89-105

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the form of pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model in which politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056151

National politics and international agreements

Kempf, Hubert; Rossignol, Stéphane - In: Journal of Public Economics 100 (2013) C, pp. 93-105

In this paper we set up a political economy model of a two-country world economy, where an international agreement on the provisions of public goods generating cross-border externalities, such as environment protection, subject to feasibility, efficiency and equity constraints, has to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010636477

Regulation versus taxation

Alesina, Alberto; Passarelli, Francesco - In: Journal of Public Economics 110 (2014) C, pp. 147-156

We study which policy tool and at what level a majority chooses in order to reduce activities with negative externalities. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the activity which produces the negative externality, a quota that forces a proportional reduction of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744247

Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes

Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - In: Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011) 9, pp. 1213-1222

, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574271

Are we taxing ourselves?

Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert - In: Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011) 1, pp. 164-176

regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574360