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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes

Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - In: Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011) 9, pp. 1213-1222

, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574271

Setting the Bar - An Experimental Investigation of Immigration Requirements

Khadjavi, Menusch; Tjaden, Jasper D. - In: Journal of Public Economics 165 (2018), pp. 160-169

employ the minimal group paradigm and immigration requirements are set by in-group voting. In order to immigrate, out …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012511626

Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods

Cox, Caleb A. - In: Journal of Public Economics 121 (2015) C, pp. 52-65

I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can reduce contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium, provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naive players who condition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190981

Are we taxing ourselves?

Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert - In: Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011) 1, pp. 164-176

regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574360

Emotion venting and punishment in public good experiments

Dickinson, David L.; Masclet, David - In: Journal of Public Economics 122 (2015) C, pp. 55-67

Experimental studies have shown that sanctions effectively deter free riding within groups. However, the over-use of costly punishment may actually harm overall welfare. A main reason for over-punishment is that free-riders generate negative emotions that likely favor excessive punishments. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011209590

Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement

Nikiforakis, Nikos; Noussair, Charles N.; Wilkening, Tom - In: Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012) 9-10, pp. 797-807

A normative conflict arises when multiple plausible rules exist, specifying how one ought to behave in a given situation. In such cases, enforcing one normative rule can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608540

Individual evolutionary learning, other-regarding preferences, and the voluntary contributions mechanism

Arifovic, Jasmina; Ledyard, John - In: Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012) 9-10, pp. 808-823

The data from experiments with the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism suggest five stylized facts, including the restart … does. In addition, our theory answers some open questions concerning the data on partners–strangers experiments. One … data generated by our model are quantitatively similar to data from a variety of experiments, and experimenters, and are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608548

See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity

Steiger, Eva-Maria; Zultan, Ro'i - In: Journal of Public Economics 109 (2014) C, pp. 1-12

We study experimentally voluntary contributions to public goods when none, some, or all previous decisions are observable. When agents observe previous moves, they tend to condition their cooperation on observed cooperation. This leads to two effects of increased transparency: on the one hand,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010730190

Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision

Andreoni, James; Gee, Laura K. - In: Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012) 11, pp. 1036-1046

This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the “hired gun” mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056154

On cooperation in open communities

Gürerk, Özgür; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rockenbach, Bettina - In: Journal of Public Economics 120 (2014) C, pp. 220-230

preferred community. Tiebout (1956) conjectured that “voting with feet” might generate considerable efficiency gains, since … communities' success. Voting with feet improves cooperation by facilitating the right initial match between individuals and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117646

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