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Costly punishment can facilitate cooperation in public-goods games, as human subjects will incur costs to punish non-cooperators even in settings where it is unlikely that they will face the same opponents again. Understanding when and why it occurs is important both for the design of economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008522549
This paper shows that the presence of different types of players – those who only care about their own material payoffs and those who reciprocate others' contributions – can explain the robust features of observed contribution patterns in public good contribution games, even without the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577657
This paper shows that the presence of different types of players - those who only care about their own material payoffs and those who reciprocate others' contributions - can explain the robust features of observed contribution patterns in public good contribution games, even without the presence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009023615