This paper constructs an optimal incentive tax/subsidy scheme in an oligopoly market with pollution, as a generalization of the Loeb-Magat scheme, which is nondiscriminatory and requires less information for implementation than the conventional ones. Some interesting properties of the scheme are...

This paper analyzes the self-selection problem in a monopoly market where (1) consumer types are characterized by both utility of service and disutility of interrupted service and (2) qualities (reliabilities) are interdependent. The authors derive behavior of a profit-maximizing monopolist in...

The purpose of this paper is to analyze strategic behavior of vertically integrated firms when there is downstream entry, taking into account the balance between "competition in the market" and "competition for the market." This analysis can serve to explain diverse distributional structures,...

The purpose of the present paper is to construct a regulatory scheme that serves to correct suboptimal behavior of a multi-product monopolist in a situation of doubly asymmetric information, where the regulator cannot observe the monopolist's cost structure and consumers' preference while the...