In this paper we argue that spatial voting games and power index models are not necessarily exclusive ways to analyse EU decision-making. We find that the two main criticisms pointed out by scholars of spatial voting games, namely that power indices do not take into account preferences or the...

This is a reply to Dan Felsenthal's and Moshé Machover's verdict on the Holler-Widgrén contribution to the Symposium on `Power Indices and the European Union' in the July 1999 issue of this Journal. It questions the benefits of discussing the game-theoretical nature of power indices and argues...

This paper demonstrates that the mathematical properties of the member bargaining power measure (MBP) are identical with those of the public good index (PGI). However, the underlying theoretical concepts of the two measures are different. The MBP refers to bargaining over shares of the coalition...

This paper examines a recent debate in the literature on power indices in which classical measures such as the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik, and Public Good indices have been criticized on the grounds that they do not take into account player preferences. It has been argued that an index that is...