We analyze strategic communication and voting when agents do not necessarily have common beliefs and values. The potential for some pairs of participants to have opposed preferences makes truthful revelation difficult to support. Nonetheless, truthful equilibria are shown to exist for some...

This article presents a model of collective choice when group decisions must be justified by arguments from first principles. Individuals may have preferences over both the actions chosen and the arguments used to justify them. Defining a notion of stability in the arguments made and actions...

We present a game-theoretic model of the social dynamics of belief change in which the (relevant) logically non-omniscient audience becomes convinced that the speakers' messages are `true' because its own prior beliefs logically entail them, rather than — as in cheap-talk models —...

The debate over the relative merits of directional and proximity models as theories of candidate evaluation has turned largely on the criterion of predictiveness. This article adds to the predictive record for France and the United States in 1988 but also focuses on the criterion of...