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Resource allocation when different candidates are stronger on different issues

Hummel, Patrick - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 25 (2013) 1, pp. 128-149

that issue. I find that incumbents are especially likely to use an inefficient resource allocation if voters care a lot …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010684613

Effort, Intensity and Position Taking

Bawn, Kathleen; Koger, Gregory - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 20 (2008) 1, pp. 67-92

Effort is a crucial element of the legislative process â€” writing bills, forming coalitions, crafting strategies, and … debating. We develop a model in which legislative decisions are the product of competitive effort by two teams, one trying to … pass new legislation, and the other to block it. Teams choose effort levels based on preferences over the policy outcome …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777924

Is There Really a Turnout Paradox?

Medina, Luis Fernando - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2011) 3, pp. 382-399

This paper challenges the notion that voting games with purely instrumental players cannot account for high turnout (the ‘turnout paradox'). Although it has been known for over 25 years that such games can generate high-turnout equilibria, the said equilibria have been rejected on the grounds...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294412

On the buyability of voting bodies

Morgan, John; Várdy, Felix - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2011) 2, pp. 260-287

We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367604

Seizing the mantle of change: Modeling candidate quality as effectiveness instead of valence

Miller, Michael K - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2011) 1, pp. 52-68

In spatial models of electoral competition, candidate quality is typically modeled as valence, a measure of general appeal assumed to be constant across voters. This paper introduces and formally models an alternative conception of candidate quality according to which candidates differ in their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367607

Elections and reform: The adoption of civil service systems in the U.S. states

Ting, Michael M; Jr, James M Snyder; Hirano, Shigeo; … - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 25 (2013) 3, pp. 363-387

electoral advantage. Our main result is that politicization persists when incumbents expect to win, and insulation takes place …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010684609

Strategic party placement with a dynamic electorate

III, James E Monogan - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 25 (2013) 2, pp. 284-298

This article expands upon formal research on elections by considering competition in a dynamic environment of multiple … elections. The key assumptions are that the ideology of the electorate is changing in a known way, parties cannot change their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010684612

Symposium. The Directional Theory of Issue Voting: IV

Morris, Irwin L.; Rabinowitz, George - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 9 (1997) 1, pp. 75-88

There are two distinct views on how candidate (or party) issue strategies influence mass evaluations. One is the view underlying the classic spatial model that the proximity between the voter's own issue positions and the positions taken by the candidates drives the evaluation. The other view is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777765

Do Parties Benefit from Electoral Manipulation? Electoral Laws and Heresthetics in Poland, 1989-93

Kaminski, Marek M. - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 14 (2002) 3, pp. 325-358

and new entrants and coalitions that emerged in the period between the introduction of the new electoral law and elections …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777777

The Legislative Median and Partisan Policy

Wiseman, Alan E.; Wright, John R. - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 20 (2008) 1, pp. 5-29

We show that the median legislator in the US House is unambiguously closer to the majority party median than to the minority party median. An important implication of this finding is that the median legislator is predisposed to support the majority party's policy agenda. Thus, in the event that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777840