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Tit for tat : foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings
Segal, Uzi; Sobel, Joel - In: Journal of economic theory 136 (2007) 1, pp. 197-216
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003552131
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Null or nullifying players : the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
Brink, René van den - In: Journal of economic theory 136 (2007) 1, pp. 767-775
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003552978
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Economists' models of learning
Sobel, Joel - In: Journal of economic theory 94 (2000) 2, pp. 241-261
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001523876
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Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
Blume, Andreas - In: Journal of economic theory 65 (1995) 2, pp. 359-382
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001179575
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Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
Rabin, Matthew - In: Journal of economic theory 68 (1996) 1, pp. 1-25
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001193976
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Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
Cho, In-Koo - In: Journal of economic theory 50 (1990) 2, pp. 381-413
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001082320
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On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics
Cabrales, Antonio - In: Journal of economic theory 57 (1992) 2, pp. 407-419
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001330379
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Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
Sobel, Joel - In: Journal of economic theory 52 (1990) 2, pp. 304-331
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001095688