This paper compares two contrasting approaches to robust monetary policy design. The first developed by Hansen and Sargent (2003, 2007) assumes unstructured model uncertainty and uses a minimax robustness criterion to design monetary rules. This contrasts with an older literature that structures...

We examine an interesting puzzle in monetary economics between what monetary authorities claim (namely to be forward-looking and pre-emptive) and the poor stabilization properties routinely reported for forecast-based rules. Our resolution is that central banks should be viewed as following...

The objectives of this paper are : first, to quantify the stabilization welfare gains from commitment; second, to examine how commitment to an optimal rule can be sustained as an equilibrium and third, to find a simple interest rate rule that closely approximates the optimal commitment one. We...

Recent interest in "Risk Management"has highlighted the relevance of Bayesian analysis for robust monetary-policy making. This paper sets out a comprehensive methodology for designing policy rules inspired by such considerations. We design rules that are robust with respect to model uncertainty...

We investigate the role of economic transparency within the framework of one of Townsend's models of "forecasting the forecasts of others". The equilibrium has the property that "higher order beliefs"; are coordinated into a finite-dimensional setup that is amenable to address monetary policy...