We describe a theory of the collective choice of fiscal policy in dynamic economies that are subject to aggregate shocks. The theory incorporates realistically complex policy spaces, rational forward-looking agents, and a rich political decision process. We argue that it provides a tractable...

We study political activism by several interest groups with private signals. When their ideological distance to the policymaker is small, a "low-trust" regime prevails: agents frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted, taking advantage of the confirmation provided by others' activism;...

This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Because voters have only one vote to cast and regulatory issues are not salient...

This paper presents a theory of political competition with campaign contributions and informa-tive political advertising. Policy-motivated parties compete by selecting candidates and interest groups provide contributions to enhance the electoral prospects of like-minded candidates....