We study political activism by several interest groups with private signals. When their ideological distance to the policymaker is small, a "low-trust" regime prevails: agents frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted, taking advantage of the confirmation provided by others' activism;...

We describe a theory of the collective choice of fiscal policy in dynamic economies that are subject to aggregate shocks. The theory incorporates realistically complex policy spaces, rational forward-looking agents, and a rich political decision process. We argue that it provides a tractable...

I study the interactions between the distribution of human capital, technological choice, and redistributive institutions. I first ask what makes alternative social contracts such as a European-style "welfare state" and U.S.-style "laissez-faire" sustainable, and in particular how each is...

I develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained (yet individually rational) distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets. In processing and interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education, health insurance, pensions,...