We present a model of incomplete information games with sets of priors. Upon arrival of private information, each player "updates" by the Bayes rule each of priors in this set to construct the set of posteriors consistent with the arrived piece of information. Then the player uses a possibly...

This paper considers a two agent model of trade with multiple priors. First, we characterize the existence of an agreeable bet on some event in terms of the set of priors. It is then shown that the existence of an agreeable bet on some event is a strictly stronger condition than the existence of...

This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either Bewley's incomplete preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences. The main results...

This paper proposes a class of weak additivity concepts for an operator on the set of real valued functions on a finite state space Ω, which include additivity and comonotonic additivity as extreme cases. Let E ⊆ 2Ω be a collection of subsets of Ω. Two functions x and y on Ω are...

This paper proposes a class of weak additivity concepts for an operator on the set of real valued functions on a finite state space \omega, which include additivity and comonotonic additivity as extreme cases. Let \epsilon be a collection of subsets of \omega. Two functions x and y on \omega are...

This paper presents a general framework to understand the possibility of a purely speculative trade under asymmetric information, where the decision making rule of each trader conforms to the multiple priors model (Gibloa and Schmeidler, 1989): the agents are interested in the minimum of the...