We show how non-price-taking behavior by agents in partial equilibrium can be analyzed using strategic versions of Marshallian supply and demand curves. There is a Nash equilibrium of a two-good, strategic market game at a given price if and only if the strategic supply and demand curves...

We show in the context of a bilateral oligopoly where all agents are allowed to behave strategically the unexpected result that when the number of buyers becomes large the outcomes in a strategic market game do not converge to those at the Cournot equilibrium. However, convergence to Cournot...

We prove existence and uniqueness of non-autarkic equilibria in bilateral oligopoly assuming only that preferences are binormal and satisfy a weakened version of gross substitutes. We permit complete heterogeneity of preferences and our analysis exploits the fact that payoffs depend only on own...

This paper analyses strategic trade within pure exchange economies. In the tradition of the ‘Shapley-Shubik’ case, the signals agents send to the markets are aggregated into market prices, proceeding which net trades are determined via a distribution mechanism dependent on both individual...

We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. In contrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, and can readily analyse games...

This paper analyses the behaviour of TV gameshow contestants to estimate risk aversion. We are able to show that the gameshow participants are broadly representative of the population as a whole. The gameshow has a number of features that makes it well suited for our analysis: the format is...

This paper considers the extent to which expenditure by contestants in imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contests dissipates all or only part of the rent. In particular, we investigate strategic effects, technological effects and asymmetry under an assumption of diminishing returns to...

We study Nash equilibria of joint production games under a mixed output sharing rule in which part of the output (the mixing parameter) is shared in proportion to inputs and the rest according to exogenously determined shares. This rule includes proportional sharing and equal sharing as special...

We show that the presence of loss aversion on the part of participants in a Tullock imperfectly discriminating contest will significantly reduce the proportion of the rent dissipated in the form of resources used up in the competition for that rent. We also suggest a simple experiment that can...

We investigate the Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectly discriminating contests, focusing on existence, uniqueness and rent dissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a production function with decreasing returns for each contestant, equilibria are...